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Abstract
SDG 17 calls for the international community to “strengthen themeans of implementation and revitalize the global partner-
ship for sustainable development,” emphasizing the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships for achieving the SDGs. Policy
documents are repletewith statements on the necessity of ‘meaningful’ engagement, especiallywith civil society—without
clarifying what ‘meaningful’ stands for. In this article, we develop an analytical approach to partnership as a form and
norm of metagovernance. Partnership as a metanorm is about the roles and relations of different sets of actors. We sug-
gest operationalizing the concept of partnership according to different levels of accountability and participation, allowing
for a gradual enhancement of the quality of partnership in terms of ‘meaningfulness.’ We apply our analytical model to
the Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-Being for All (GAP), a fairly new initiative by health and development
agencies to accelerate progress towards the health-related targets of the 2030 Agenda. By investigating the development
and the early phase of implementing the GAP, we empirically assess if and how the notion of partnership envisioned in
the GAP qualifies as ‘meaningful’ with respect to civil society engagement. From our empirical example, we infer lessons
for attaining normative standards of ‘meaningfulness’ and highlight implications for future research on partnerships.
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1. Introduction
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) stipulate
how we should shape our future social and econom-
ic development and what kind of transformations this
requires. The challenge, however, lies in the logic of the
SDGs: Due to their interconnectedness, it will not suf-
fice to tackle each Goal separately. Therefore, thinking
and acting in silos must be overcome. For the trans-
formation envisioned by the SDGs, a global partner-
ship is needed. It is not sufficient to apply and com-
bine variousmodes of governance. Instead, we also have
to take the ‘governance of governance,’ i.e., metagov-
ernance, into account (Christopoulos, Horvath, & Kull,
2012; Meuleman, 2019; Meuleman & Niestroy, 2015).
SDG 17 asks the international community to “strength-
en the means of implementation and revitalize the glob-
al partnership for sustainable development.” Among the
17 SDGs adopted by the United Nations in 2015, SDG 17
is unique in that it does not address specific policy
tasks. Instead, it is about the ‘right’ way of collabora-
tion between different actors.We argue that partnership
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can be conceptualized as metanorm associated with
guidelines on how problems should be tackled and by
whom. Thus, as a standard of appropriate behavior, also
called metagovernance norm, it defines what good gov-
ernance of governance should look like (Pantzerhielm,
Holzscheiter, & Bahr, 2020).
The targets associated with SDG 17 relate to financ-
ing development, capacity building, the role of technolo-
gy and trade, and raise several systemic issues. Amongst
the latter are two targets (17.16, 17.17) that highlight
the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships in achiev-
ing the SDGs. In this article, we focus on the role of
CSOs, which are explicitly addressed as part of multi-
stakeholder partnerships “thatmobilize and share knowl-
edge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to
support the achievement of the sustainable develop-
ment goals in all countries, in particular developing coun-
tries” (UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs,
n.d.). Engagement of civil society is considered crucial
both for the achievement of the SDGs and for the polit-
ical transformation of global governance. However, its
role remains unclear and its potential untapped (c.f.
Buxton, 2019; Smith, Buse, & Gordon, 2016). Including
CSOs in policy processes is also based on normative con-
siderations that revolve around the concept of legitimacy
(Nasiritousi, Hjerpe, & Bäckstrand, 2016): Incorporating
different stakeholder interests and entering into a discur-
sive exchangewith civil society representatives enhances
the democratic legitimacy of global governance. Their
embeddedness in societies on the one hand, and their
expertise and independence (or commercial disinterest)
on the other, make CSOs guardians of societal interests
and watchdogs over decisions taken. We suggest that
these ideal-type roles allow for a conceptualization and
operationalization of both the processual and the rela-
tional dimension of partnership as metanorm. From a
normative and conceptual point of view, partnership
only becomes ‘meaningful,’ then, if CSOs are able to per-
form these roles.
We analyze the role of civil society within one exam-
ple of a recent metagovernance partnership, the fairly
new Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-being
for All, henceforth GAP (WHO, 2019d). This new partner-
ship aims to accelerate country progress on the health-
related SDGs by enhancing the collaboration among 12
global organizations engaged in health, development
and humanitarian relief. For a more effective way of
implementing their programs, however, the organiza-
tions seek closer engagement with other stakeholders as
well, like communities, civil society, or the private sec-
tor. By analyzing the potential of the GAP to live up to
the normative expectation of creating ‘meaningful’ part-
nerships between CSOs and GAP members, we are scru-
tinizing its ‘partnershipability.’ The contribution of this
article is thus threefold: First, we take a prominent con-
cept of global politics and specify it as form and norm
of metagovernance with particular attention to the role
of civil society. Second, drawing together existing liter-
ature on accountability and participation, we introduce
an innovative operationalization of the metanorm ‘part-
nership’ which entails standards for empirically assessing
civil society engagement against normative expectations
with a focus on relational and processual dimensions.
Third, we analyze an important and recent example of
metagovernance in global health by tracing CSO engage-
ment in the GAP.
Accordingly, we proceed as follows: Section 2
explores key assumptions and conceptualizes partner-
ship as form and norm of metagovernance and the role
of CSOs therein. Section 3 operationalizes ‘meaningful’
partnership as metanorm by introducing participation
and accountability, and presents a framework to assess
the quality of partnerships in terms of fulfilling the nor-
mative standard of ‘meaningfulness.’ Section 4 employs
these theoretical considerations to empirically assess if
and how the notion of partnership envisioned in the
GAP qualifies as ‘meaningful’ with respect to civil soci-
ety engagement. Section 5 discusses the lessonswe draw
from our empirical example for attaining the norm of
‘meaningfulness’ and highlights implications for future
research on partnerships.
2. Partnership as Form and Norm of Metagovernance
and the Role of Civil Society
Partnerships are everywhere. Amidst this ubiquity, the
following section briefly spells out our understanding of
partnership and civil society’s role therein. At its core,
partnership describes a relationship between different
actors, be they individuals, collective actors, states, firms,
or other entities. More specifically, partnership is differ-
ent from other social relationships as it entails a sense
of cooperation. It elicits positive connotations of two or
more actors sharing responsibility to achieve something
(positive) and suggests mutual obligations and the equal-
ity of ‘partners’ involved. Beyond its normative appeal,
however, the lack of more precise understandings of the
normativity of partnership starkly contrasts with the per-
vasive application and focal role it plays in global gov-
ernance. To anchor the following discussion, we think
of partnership as both form and norm of global gover-
nance extending across levels and modes of governance,
from individual partnerships, e.g., public private part-
nerships, or bilateral aid relationships, to global collec-
tive endeavors.
As a form, partnerships in a minimal definition then
describe relations between a multitude of diverse actors
or stakeholders in a specific, namely cooperative man-
ner. Partnerships are generally understood as innovative
forms of governance that bring together different types
of actors, from governments to business and civil society,
with their respective resources and advantages. Their
flexibility, financial resources and strategic approaches
are thought to help close the implementation and gover-
nance gap and the diversity of participants as shrinking
the participation gap in global governance (Bäckstrand,
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2006, p. 293). It is beyond the scope of this article to
delve into the emergence of partnerships in global gover-
nance at the end of the 20th century. Suffice to say that it
was closely linked to the hope of meeting the aforemen-
tioned functional demands at a time of severe criticism
of the effectiveness and legitimacy of international insti-
tutions (Bäckstrand, 2006). In this article, we zoom in on
a hybrid form of global governance with partnership as a
manifestation of metagovernance.
As a norm, partnership encompasses more or less
specified and formalized principles for practicing coop-
erative interactions. To understand and scrutinize pro-
cesses and standards of global governance is of increas-
ing importance as transnational activities and partner-
ships expand (Scholte, 2011; Tallberg, Bäckstrand, &
Scholte, 2018). There is broad agreement that gov-
ernance beyond the state requires different mecha-
nisms and yardsticks to ensure and assess legitimacy
than national democratic institutions (Scholte, 2014).
Traditional notions of formal delegation and direct and
hierarchical lines of representation between ‘we the peo-
ple’ and governments give way to thinking about plu-
ralist governance forms (Goodhart, 2014; Macdonald,
2018). SDG 17’s call to “strengthen the means of imple-
mentation and revitalize the global partnership” open-
ly acknowledges partnership as an engagement of a
wide range of stakeholders and different governance
modes, i.e., as a form of metagovernance. Yet SDG 17
also highlights the intrinsic challenges for the notion
of partnership in global governance: Global relations
are characterized by unequal roles, power and voice
as well as distant or indirect relationships (Rubenstein,
2007). Partnerships in the SDGs are aimed at accelerating
progress towards the SDGs, thus addressing sustainabili-
ty and the well-being of the global population. However,
people’s situations and vulnerabilities vary starkly, and
their voices are unequally heard, depending on their
resources and access to sites of decision-making. What,
then, should and does the “governance of governance”
(e.g., Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009, p. 818) for the SDGs look
like? Due to its central role for the SDG agenda, we argue
that it is critical to scrutinize the quality of partnerships
beneath the vague but powerful positive associations
the partnership concept evokes.
In the remainder of this article, the conceptual and
empirical discussions focus on the role of civil society in
partnerships. Their role in global governance has carried
most of the hope attributed to a legitimization of glob-
al governance or ‘good’ partnerships in the 1990s and
early 2000s (Nanz & Steffek, 2004). NGOs were regarded
as addressing democratic deficits of global governance,
mostly by giving voice to (underrepresented) societal
and evenmarginalized interests of affected communities
and individuals and by drawing attention to unaccount-
ed power (Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999). Civil society
was key to increase pressure on global economic actors,
and had an impact on changing the norms and context
of debate (Cutler et al., 1999; Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
The honeymoon period with new actors and modes
of global governance has given way to a more critical
engagement withmulti-stakeholder approaches, and civ-
il society’s own influence and accountability have come
under scrutiny (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Rubenstein, 2007).
Participation of CSOs has been criticized for being driven
by large ‘Northern’ NGOs not representative of concerns
of the Global South and marginalized interests. On a dif-
ferent level, the quality of participation and the abili-
ty to hold other relevant actors accountable have been
considered weak and even further diminishing (Buxton,
2019). Among CSOs, on the other hand, there seems to
be a growing concern that previous moderate success-
es in formalizing the partnership norm are not upheld
(CPDE, 2020).
Individual regimes, transnational companies and
international organizations have individual mechanisms
at their disposal to ensure transparency and account-
ability to members or ‘stakeholders.’ Already, these are
considered insufficient and problematic to satisfy more
ambitious or ‘democratic’ conceptions of transparency
and accountability (Goodhart, 2014; Macdonald, 2018;
Papadopoulos, 2014). In the case of metagovernance,
CSOs’ impediments to fulfil their ‘democratizing’ role
in global governance are exacerbated by the involve-
ment of various actors and different types of actors.
Overlapping authorities and complex lines of responsi-
bility render visibility and information-gathering difficult.
Scrutinizing “the opaque and dynamic forms of power
exercised through networked and other non-hierarchical
structures” (Macdonald, 2018, p. 456) poses a signifi-
cant challenge. Against this background, the next section
operationalizes the metanorm partnership in order to
move beyond mere description towards a critical exami-
nation of normative standards for partnership practices.
3. Operationalizing Partnership through Participation
and Accountability
What does good partnership look like? More precisely,
when does a partnership qualify as such, and what is
civil society’s role? These questions guide the following
section. CSOs’ two-fold role as ‘guardian’ and ‘watchdog’
allows for an assessment of both the processual and the
relational dimension of partnership as metanorm. From
an ideal-type perspective, as guardians, CSOs’ participa-
tion should ensure that the concerns of society, of under-
represented and marginalized groups are heard and con-
sidered in the process of decision-making. As watchdogs,
they are supposed to assume a crucial role in account-
ability relationships as they transmit information, chan-
nel expertise and opinions on the matter at hand and
allow for public scrutiny. It goes beyond the scope of this
article to detail the theoretical literature on participation
and accountability in global governance (e.g., Bovens,
Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014; Haas, 2004; Macdonald,
2018; Scholte, 2011). Drawing on this literature, it is
our aim to operationalize standards for practices of
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cooperation in a manner that fits the character of global
partnerships and allows for an empirical analysis.
Regarding metagovernance partnerships, members
each have their own formal and informal procedures
for participation and accountability. Vertical lines of par-
ticipation and accountability (i.e., principal-agent rela-
tions of member states and international organizations)
coexist with horizontal checks and balances between
members within the partnership, i.e., mutual account-
ability mechanisms. This leads to a complex system of
multipolar relationships and processes (Bruen, Brugha,
Kageni, & Wafula, 2014). For partnerships themselves,
as institutionalized forms of networked andmultilayered
metagovernance, scholars have discussed and called for
pluralistic approaches to legitimacy and accountability.
These encompass, for instance, courts or other oversight
institutions, complaint mechanisms and monitoring sys-
tems (Macdonald, 2018), as well as peer-based and repu-
tational mechanisms enhancing collective accountability
(Benner, Reinicke, & Witte, 2004). Among core proposi-
tions are increased visibility and accessibility as well as
better involvement and empowerment of stakeholders
(Slaughter, 2004). It is here thatwe see civil society’s func-
tional role for enhancing partnerships’ legitimacy. CSOs
then act on behalf of others, namely affected people
who lack the capacity to raise their voice and hold actors
and institutions to account. CSOs serve as “surrogates”
(Rubenstein, 2007, pp. 623–627) or “proxies” (Koenig-
Archibugi & Macdonald, 2013, p. 499) during the coop-
eration process. These practices need to be assessed
according to other normative criteria than more tradi-
tional vertical mechanisms of delegation and account-
ability and are always “second-best,” as Rubenstein
(2007, p. 623) cautions. This becomes clear when prob-
lematizing the relationship between proxies and those
they are presumably acting on behalf of. Defining and dis-
tinguishing ‘affected people’ is not always possible. And
even if it is, ensuring the accountability of proxies speak-
ing in the interests of these affected people is problem-
atic (Papadopoulos, 2014).
Bearing this in mind, we propose a simplistic model
of two sets of actors: In this case between formal mem-
bers of a partnership and those who are proclaimed to
be indispensable for its success and legitimacy, i.e., civ-
il society actors. We contend that in a pluralist under-
standing of legitimate global governance, CSOs as third
parties can collect and provide information, thereby cre-
ating a public sphere that is necessary for accountabili-
ty and is otherwise mostly absent from multi-level gov-
ernance (Hirschmann, 2019, p. 24; Papadopoulos, 2014,
pp. 277–278). This again creates a space for monitoring
compliance and justification. We now take a closer look
at the two interrelated processes of participation and
accountability, which we use to operationalize partner-
ship as metanorm.
Regarding participation (left field in Figure 1), we
first envision attendance as unidirectional relationships
encompassing physical attendance by civil society actors
on the one hand and information sharing by formal par-
ticipants on the other. When the role of CSOs becomes
more active and involves a first level of consultation,
submitting written or oral reports or opinions, we term
this ‘engagement’ (or ‘involvement’). If this is met with
feedback, i.e., reflection and discussion, it constitutes a
first instance of more active participation. Here, then,
CSOs engage in processes of opinion-building and policy-
making and we witness forms of interaction. In a next
level of consultation, input is allowed for and reflect-
ed upon during agenda-setting. ‘Meaningful’ participa-
tion might then even extend to having influence on
decision-making. This, however, is neither always possi-
ble nor desirable in all forms. The direct influence of non-
state actors in decision-making poses other democratic-
theoretical questions, which go beyond the scope of
this discussion.
What we contend, however, for our topic of ‘mean-
ingful’ participation is the core issue of responsiveness.
While all of the above are labelled participation, we
find that for participation to be ‘meaningful,’ a minimal
threshold of responsiveness on the part of formal partici-
pants is required. It reflects the capacity of CSOs to bring
attention to their opinions and issues, thereby (hopeful-
ly) integrating the demands of larger groups of stakehold-
ers. Participation then entails a very different relation-
ship and is more interactive and equal. CSOs are integrat-
ed into policy-making processes, giving them an active or
possibly even influential role.
We define accountability as a social relationship
between an agent who can be held accountable and
face consequences, and another agent who holds the
former accountable (Bovens, 2007, p. 450). Crucial for
accountability (right field in Figure 1) are the ques-
tions who is holding whom to account for what and
how (Hesselmann, 2011). We shorten the debate about
‘who’ and ‘whom’ for our conceptual model to CSOs
as proxy accountability-holders and formal members
as power-wielders and accountability-givers (Rubenstein,
2007). We suggest thinking of the ‘how’ as a gradu-
al process: Often, the unilateral sharing of information,
i.e., transparency, is termed accountability. We refrain
from equating transparency and accountability. The for-
mer embodies a unidirectional relationship and remains
at the discretion of the information-sharer. Only with
the idea of answerability, i.e., the position and right
to demand information (here by CSOs), do we begin
to speak of accountability and of a two-way relation-
ship. If information is then met with mechanisms of
response, potentially even including reward or sanction,
this signals a different form of relationship. And third-
ly, if evaluations lead to an adaptation in policies or
behavior, the role of CSOs as proxy accountability-taker
can be deemed influential and the relationship more
equal. Again, we view responsiveness as a core threshold
for ‘meaningful’ partnership. Together with ‘meaning-
ful’ participation, ‘meaningful’ accountability then forms
‘meaningful’ partnership.
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Figure 1. Operationalizing ‘meaningful’ partnership.
The question of ‘for what’ one is being held account-
able is just as complex as ‘how.’ Simply put, account-
ability can refer to outputs and outcomes of discus-
sions and even impacts of policies. Having a clear under-
standing of roles and responsibilities helps to define
the ‘for what’ and is one core obstacle to accountabil-
ity in complex governance situations. However, in this
article we wish to draw attention to another aspect,
i.e., the processual dimensions of accountability and
participation and their interrelatedness. In a processu-
al understanding of accountability (and participation),
‘what’ also encompasses the process itself. Thus, we add
another layer to the process of partnership, which is
concerned with addressing the context of the partner-
ship, i.e., obstacles to participation and accountability.
Are CSOs able to give feedback about a set of context vari-
ables, i.e., material constraints for participation, inclu-
sion of core stakeholders, access to discussion and dis-
regard of input, etc.? In relation to accountability, do
they have the capacities to follow decision-making pro-
cesses in a well-informed manner and are they acknowl-
edged in their accountability-taking role? If not, are
accountability-takers named at all? On the part of formal
participants/accountability-givers: What is their reaction
to feedback? Are obstacles addressed and overcome,
or are they disregarded? The manner in which these
obstacles to participation and accountability are raised
and dealt with (feedback and reactions) needs to be
included in a critical analysis of the realities of partner-
ships. They signal different levels of process participa-
tion and accountability and allow for an early assessment
of the quality of partnership, i.e., its ‘meaningfulness.’
The example we have chosen to illustrate this is the GAP
on SDG 3.
4. ‘Meaningful’ Partnership? Roles and Relations in the
Global Action Plan for Health
The GAP on SDG 3 is a paradigmatic example of study-
ing ‘meaningful’ partnership since the two concepts of
participation and accountability are among its defin-
ing features and primary goals. For the collaborating
agencies, attaining both contributes to the successful
achievement of SDG 3 and other health-related targets.
We traced the process of developing the GAP and the
beginning of the implementation phase by analyzing the
available primary (text and video) sources published by
the participating organizations and civil society actors
(e.g., documents, reports, records and recordings of
meetings, correspondence, working papers, blogs, eval-
uations). The objective was to uncover how the process
of engaging with civil society actors unfolded within our
analytical framework, which roles the different actors
were taking and what kind of relations were evolving
between the participating agencies and CSOs. By analyz-
ing the origin and implementation of the GAP, the intrica-
cies of formal partnership members engaging with civil
society become visible. In the following, we will briefly
introduce the GAP and the relevance assigned to CSOs
in its implementation, before we discuss if it meets the
criteria that we spelled out above for ‘meaningful’ partic-
ipation and accountability.
It was only in April 2018 that the heads of
the governments of Germany, Ghana and Norway
approached the WHO to accelerate the process towards
achieving SDG 3. In a letter addressed to WHO
Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, they
proposed the development of a joint Global Action
Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-Being, thus unit-
ing relevant actors in global health to “streamline
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their efforts” (Merkel, Akufo-Addo, & Solberg, 2018).
In September 2018, the WHO released an outline
Towards a Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-
being for All: Uniting to Accelerate Progress towards
the Health-Related SDGs (WHO, 2018c), followed by the
actual GAP document entitled Stronger Collaboration,
Better Health: Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives
and Well-being for All: Strengthening Collaboration
among Multilateral Organizations to Accelerate Country
Progress on theHealth-Related SustainableDevelopment
Goals in October 2019 (WHO, 2019d). In essence, the
GAP is aimed at furthering the collaboration between
12 global organizations that work in the fields of health,
development and humanitarian relief (GAVI, the Vaccine
Alliance, Global Financing Facility, the Global Fund,
UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, Unitaid, UN Women,
World Bank, World Food Programme, WHO). This collab-
oration rests on four commitments: engage, accelerate,
align, account. The actual work revolves around seven
‘accelerator themes’: primary health care, sustainable
financing for health, community and civil society engage-
ment, determinants of health, innovative programming
in fragile and vulnerable settings and for disease out-
break responses, research and development, innovation
and access, and, lastly, data and digital health.
The history of the development of the GAP shows
some of the obstacles CSOs face when participating in
global policy processes—in this case at the metagov-
ernance level. CSOs are usually defined as non-state,
not-for-profit, voluntary organizations. This distinguishes
them fromphilanthropic organizations or actors from the
private sector. Although compared to the latter, CSOs
usually have less financial and human resources at their
disposal, the list of contributions they are expected to
make in providing public goods and reaching the SDGs
is quite long (e.g., Greer, Wismar, Pastorino, & Kosinska,
2017; Smith et al., 2016). Since they are seen as the
group of actors closest to the needs of communities,
CSOs are attributed the role of giving marginalized and
vulnerable groups a voice, thereby ensuring that no one
will be left behind (e.g., Greer et al., 2017). However,
the WHO especially has a long-standing history of con-
frontation with civil society about its engagement with
non-state actors. To ease civil society’s concerns about
undue influence of corporate actors and private foun-
dations on the WHO’s work, the organization adopted
a Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors in
2016 (WHO, 2016). Since then, it has continuously devel-
oped its regulatory framework (e.g., WHO, 2018a).
The task of devising a GAP was assigned to the WHO
by the governments of three member states. The WHO,
like other international organizations, is answerable
to its principals, the member states. Formally, the
accountability-takers are the members of the participat-
ing agencies, and because of scarce resources and lack
of time, international organization secretariats prioritize
withwhom to interact extensively. This puts CSOs in a dis-
advantageous position, for two reasons. Firstly, they are
not formal members and as such, they do not only have
to lobby to be heard; they also have to work on establish-
ing rules and procedures for being admitted, as the exam-
ple of the Framework of Engagement with Non-State
Actors (WHO, 2016) shows. Secondly, ‘civil society’ is an
umbrella term. It consists of vastly different groups of
actors that vary in size and resources. Usually, they also
differ in opinion, which makes it hard for their counter-
parts to identify positions that can be taken up further
and acted upon.
As far as the GAP is concerned, the group of ‘formal
participants’ in this new partnership consists of very dis-
tinct multilateral organizations, which want to “deliver
results” at country level by a “more purposeful, system-
atic, transparent and accountable collaboration” (WHO,
2019d, p. ix). However, in order to achieve this, the GAP
“recognizes that other stakeholders, including commu-
nities, civil society and the private sector, make vital
contributions to achieving the SDGs and promotes clos-
er engagement with these key partners” (WHO, 2019d,
p. xiv). In accordance with theWHO’s Thirteenth General
Programme of Work 2019–2023: Promote Health, Keep
the World Safe, Serve the Vulnerable (WHO, 2019e)
the organization has proclaimed “a new era of partner-
ship between WHO and civil society” (WHO, 2018b).
The importance of tapping into the resources of CSOs
is also acknowledged in accelerator theme three of
the GAP, which focuses on community and civil society
engagement. There, the GAP explicitly refers to SDG 17
and SDG target 16.7 (inclusive, participatory decision-
making; WHO, 2019d, p. 62).
In the GAP document, the signatories commit
to “meaningful engagement” with communities and
civil society, which exists “when participants man-
age to influence decisions on issues that affect their
lives” (WHO, 2019d, p. 62). In our conceptual discus-
sion above, we defined participation as ‘meaningful’
when civil society succeeds in exerting influence on
opinion-building, agenda-setting and decision-making.
Similarly, accountability relationships become ‘meaning-
ful’ when an accountability-giver adapts its behavior
after the accountability-taker has evaluated its perfor-
mance. For our empirical analysis of the ‘partnershipa-
bility’ of the GAP, we have translated our operationaliza-
tion into observable indicators. To assess the level of CSO
engagement, we first looked at the formal arrangements
for CSO participation as specified in the published docu-
ments. In a second step, we took into account process-
es of interaction, mainly in the form of oral and written
speeches, inputs and background information.We evalu-
ated CSOs’ inputs and consultation and their reflection in
later official documents and tried to establish what kind
of ‘influence’ they had on the process and to assess the
quality of their participation.
As far as the question of ‘meaningful’ participation
is concerned, for the period between the release of GAP
phase one in October 2018 and the launch of the GAP
at the UN General Assembly in September 2019, we can
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witness activities on all three levels we distinguished for
analytical reasons (see upper field of Figure 2). With
respect to attendance, on both occasions, civil society
actors were present at the events linked to the publi-
cation of both documents and entered into discussions
about the GAP. However, it was up to the CSOs to
offer their coordinated engagement and expertise in a
joint letter to WHO-DG Tedros (Civil Society Engagement
Mechanism, 2018). Moreover, time constraints were a
factor to consider. Originally, the three heads of govern-
ments had asked for the release of a GAP back in October
2018, which turned out to be unrealistic. Therefore, the
final document was scheduled for the September 2019
meeting of the UN General Assembly, hence setting the
timeframe for developing the GAP. For CSOs, this meant
that they had to act quickly if they wanted to engage
in opinion-building. Organizing such a disparate group
of actors, however, requires resources and above all
a coordinating body with the ability to engage, assess
and lead. Since the GAP appeared as an item on the
agenda for the January 2019 meeting of the WHO’s
Executive Board, civil society held a strategic meeting
in New York in December 2018, organized and support-
ed by the Civil Society Engagement Mechanism of the
International Health Partnership for UHC2030 and the
Global Fund Advocates Network. Shortly afterwards, in
February 2019, the Civil Society EngagementMechanism
established an advisory group of civil society and commu-
nity representatives to focus the work of civil society on
the GAP. The advisory group had the two-fold mission of
collecting input and offering itself as a leading voice of
civil society, which worked quite effectively, at least for
building and voicing the opinions of CSOs.
On the level of formal engagement, with respect to
the very tight timeframe, it seems that the WHO and
the other GAP organizations had not planned a consul-
tation process. However, especially when CSOs advocat-
ed for a public consultation, the WHO consented to hold
it—albeit at very short notice and only for an extreme-
ly limited period (WHO, 2019b). Nevertheless, civil soci-
ety was able to influence the agenda-setting process and
submit its input subsequently. But did CSO participation
also meet the ‘gold standard’ of influencing decision-
making? Here, the picture is unclear. The WHO pub-
lished a compilation of all submissions in the consulta-
tion (WHO, 2019c), highlightingwhich feedback “was tak-
en into account in the development” of the GAP (WHO,
2019a, p. 11), including issues raised by CSOs. However,
this was done only in September 2019, when the GAP
had already been scheduled for release. Therefore, it is
unclear if and to what extent the input of CSOs had an
impact while the GAP was being finalized.
Nevertheless, on paper, the frequency of interaction
on all levels of participation in the ‘constitution phase’ of
the GAP seems remarkable (see third column of Figure 2).
Still, there are CSO representatives who are critical of the
process and their relationship to the WHO as the organi-
zation leading the process (Haase & Eger, 2019; Schwarz,
2019). This criticism does not seem to be unfounded,
since it was only due to the CSOs’ perseverance that they
were able to participate in this process at all. One could
argue that it is quite indicative that the GAP document
for the first phase only spelled out three commitments,
i.e., align, accelerate, account; whereas after the some-
what enforced engagement with civil society, the final
document also lists a fourth commitment: engage.
With respect to the quality of CSO participation,
a one-day consultation which GAP organizations held
in New York in April 2019 is informative. This consul-
tation with non-state actors was limited to three out
of seven accelerator themes with a focus on commu-
nity and civil society engagement. The organizations
that were able to attend were the ‘usual’ NGOs, like
World Vision International, the International Planned
Parenthood Federation or Save the Children, which are
active in New York or able to travel there. In other words:
The GAP organizations not only decided to limit the
agenda. In addition, access to the event was based on
available resources, which also narrowed the number of
CSOs present. One could argue that although CSOs were
able to participate, their participation was still not truly
‘meaningful’ since there was no reaction from the GAP
organizations to the feedback from CSOs in the public
consultation. Another indicator of this is the fact that
while the Accelerator Discussion Paper 3 on Community
and Civil Society Engagement lists ‘contributions’ from
civil society representatives (UNAIDS&WHO, 2019) “civil
society came on board only after the development of the
accelerators and the discussion papers” (Koutsoumpa,
Nsbirwa, Schwarz, Ssemakula, & Musoke, 2020, p. 16,
emphasis added).
The second factor contributing to ‘meaningful’ part-
nership relates to accountability. In this early phase of
implementation, one year after the release of the GAP,
there are almost no mechanisms in place to make the
GAP organizations accountable in a ‘meaningful’ way
(compare lower field of Figure 2). The GAP organizations
commissioned a Joint Evaluability Assessment, which
was finalized in July 2020. Besides the need to agree
on how to operationalize the GAP and “make it con-
crete” (York, Hofer, & Watkins, 2020, p. 13), the evalu-
ators highlight the “distinct lack of clear accountabilities
(and incentives) in the GAP partnership to ensure time-
ly follow-up and actions once decisions are taken” (York
et al., 2020, p. 14). Thus, it remains open who is in a for-
mal position to demand information, i.e., to whom the
GAP organizations are answerable. Therefore, CSOs do
not knowwho to address even in their role as ‘surrogates’
or ‘proxy’ accountability-takers.
In May 2020, the WHO published an overview of the
operating model of the GAP (GAP, 2020) in an attempt to
specify how the GAP signatories should align to collab-
orate more closely at country level. The operating mod-
el defines various groups at different levels and assigns
specific roles and responsibilities to them (cf. also WHO,
2020b, pp. 34–35). However, no information is available
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Figure 2. Assessing the ‘partnershipability’ of the GAP.
or accessible to civil society on the actual workings and
proceedings of these groups. In September 2020, the
WHO released a first progress report on implementation
of theGAPover the year since its adoption (WHO, 2020b).
In it, the GAP is characterized as an ambitious joint com-
mitment that “promotes a cultural shift within the exist-
ing health architecture towardsmore purposeful and sys-
tematic collaboration among the 12 agencies and with
countries” (WHO, 2020b, p. 1). This indicates that more
internal barriers have to be overcome by the GAP sig-
natories to achieve closer alignment of each organiza-
tion’s operations in selected countries. Increasing the
incentives for stronger collaboration among the agen-
cies is one of the challenges to implementing the GAP
mentioned in the progress report. Engaging civil society
and increasing transparency and accountability are oth-
ers (WHO, 2020b, p. 45).
To enhance civil society engagement, the GAP
agencies intend to collaborate with the Civil Society
Engagement Mechanism (WHO, 2020b, p. 24), which
acted as a successful mechanism for participation in
developing the GAP. However, in November 2019, oth-
er sections of civil society established a Watch the GAP
group, which published a first critical evaluation of the
GAP in July 2020 (Koutsoumpa et al., 2020). Even with-
out a formal mandate, civil society actors are already
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 152–163 159
scrutinizing the GAP. What is missing again, however, is
GAP organizations’ feedback on the civil society report.
In sum, there were several entry-points for CSOs dur-
ing the process of developing the GAP, which allowed
for interaction with the GAP organizations. Superficially,
it seems that civil society was able to participate in a
‘meaningful’ way. However, from the perspective of civ-
il society actors, the story reads somewhat different-
ly: CSO participation created the appearance of legiti-
macy while inclusion of their voice was neither active-
ly sought nor formalized. Civil society, as a group of
actors that are under-resourced and overstretched in
many ways, had to struggle to make itself heard. As far
as accountability is concerned many important ques-
tions are still unanswered. If the inclusion of stakehold-
ers is seen as critical for success, who then should be
included and how? The GAP organizations are commit-
ted to reporting and monitoring. But to whom, and
how can it be enforced? Are there any consequences
for non-delivery? Furthermore, a broader discussion on
roles and responsibilities of the GAP partners is lacking.
To deliver results, the GAP organizations themselves see
the need to enhance their ability to engage with stake-
holders. As far as the standard of ‘meaningfulness’ is con-
cerned, this relates particularly to reacting to CSO feed-
back in the process.
As the discussion of the GAP shows, there are
opportunities and pitfalls associated with realizing the
metanorm of ‘meaningful’ partnership. We will discuss
these in our concluding section and sketch out some
of the conditions for attaining ‘meaningful’ participa-
tion and accountability, as well as implications for future
research on partnerships.
5. Conclusion
To better understand and assess the realities of multi-
stakeholder engagement and CSOs’ role therein, we pro-
posed to think of ‘partnership’ not only as a form but
also as a norm of metagovernance. This allowed us to
focus on roles and relationships of actors in a partnership,
understood as a process of governance. Therefore, we
operationalized the concept of partnership according to
different levels of accountability and participation, allow-
ing for a gradual enhancement of the quality of partner-
ship in terms of ‘meaningfulness.’ We applied our analyt-
ical model to the GAP, which is still in the making. This
opens up the space to develop it further with a clear-
er notion of what might be necessary to make the part-
nership and engagement with civil society ‘meaningful.’
Evenmore so, since the GAP has gained traction as a role
model for a crucial component of the current responses
to the coronavirus pandemic, namely the The Access to
Covid-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator (WHO, 2020a).
The example of the GAP illustrates that with respect
to participation, there is already a considerable amount
of interaction between the formal members of a partner-
ship and CSOs. However, since CSO participation remains
informal, it was selective, in terms of permanence and
spectrum of voices. The latter makes it very hard for
formal members of partnerships to identify the ‘right’
CSOs to engage with. The currentWHO process of engag-
ing with civil society to develop a Handbook on Social
Participation for Universal Health Coverage points in a
promising direction of formalizing rules and procedures
tomake CSO engagementmore transparent and less ran-
dom (UHC2030, n.d.; WHO, 2018b). CSOs cannot act as
‘proxy’ accountability-takers if there are no mechanisms
of accountability in place, and if no obligation for formal
members to react to input provided by ‘informal’ partic-
ipants exists.
Another observation worth emphasizing relates to
the competition over resources and their allocation.
Resources are scarce not only on the part of CSOs
but also on the part of the GAP agencies. Making
more resources available for all stakeholders in multi-
stakeholder processes is somewhat illusionary. It seems
more appropriate to identify stakeholders that have
been ‘left behind’ so far. The question of defining who
falls into the category of ‘left behind’ touches on a fun-
damental concern of global governance: What should
just and fair governance look like, and who has the
authority to set the normative standards for appropri-
ate behavior? ‘Leave no one behind’ is a central prin-
ciple of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. Therefore, in
order to achieve the SDGs, it is essential to identify
stakeholders and groups who are left behind. Within
the multilateral framework of the United Nations, “‘leav-
ing no one behind’ not only entails reaching the poor-
est of the poor, but also seeks to combat discrimi-
nation and rising inequalities within and among coun-
tries, and their root causes” (UN System Chief Executives
Board for Coordination, 2017, p. 31). Subsequently, this
framework was operationalized for UN country teams
(UN Sustainable Development Group, 2019): However,
identifying those who are ‘left behind’ in practice always
takes place in a setting with political, socio-economic or
cultural struggles over power and resources at country,
regional or global levels of governance.
Finally, we would like to highlight another implica-
tion of our discussion: Conceptualizing partnership as
metanorm, and assessing the GAP accordingly, opens
up new possibilities to put partnership and the GAP’s
partnershipability into (historical) perspective and to
draw lessons from other examples. Although the GAP
is hailed as a new and innovative form of partner-
ship, earlier attempts to formalize and institutional-
ize cooperative relationships in global governance are
manifold. For instance, in the field of development
cooperation and health cooperation, the ‘aid effective-
ness norm’ was endorsed at summits and assessed
through ensuing monitoring processes between 2005
and 2011, leading to the Global Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation (Abdel-Malek, 2015; Barnes
& Brown, 2011). The goal was to establish a global
partnership promoting recipient countries’ ownership by
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harmonizing and aligning donor practices and enhancing
mutual accountability. Civil society was integrated only
later in the process, due to CSO pressure. Subsequently,
CSOs were successful in establishing a rather promi-
nent position in the Global Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation. Even though the norm has
“declined and potentially died” (Brown, 2020, p. 1230),
the GAP terms and language are reminiscent of the aid
effectiveness vocabulary in many ways. Further research
on earlier and current alternative forms of ‘global part-
nerships’ and their level and quality of participation and
accountability seems promising to identify obstacles to
‘meaningful partnership’ as a metagovernance norm in a
comparative and more systematic way.
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